

Research article

What Motivated the Creation of Palestinian NGOs?

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Abstract

This study examines the motivations behind the creation of the Palestinian nongovernmental organizations (PNGOs). Presenting the findings of 40 PNGOs in the West Bank, the study analyses finding based on primary qualitative and quantitative data collected from the field. Data collection methods are survey on the organization, in-depth interview to support the finding and building a case study over four organizations. The study finds that the main motives behind the creation of the PNGOs are for serving political factions and their individual founder's interests. Moreover, this paper examines the assumption that current NGOs structure and leaders' motives damage governance and enable NGO managers to hijack the organization for their personal interests. The paper recommends putting an end of favoritism and discrimination in PNGOs memberships, services and programs, NGOs should target the public and all social groups without discrimination or favoritism in terms of employment opportunities, membership criteria, and service provision. In addition, to activate NGOs governing Bodies by: opening their membership based on pre-determined criteria for GA membership and encourage both GA's members and the public to participate in the discussion of NGO issues. **Copyright © www.acascipub.com, all right reserved.**

Key words: Governance, Board of Directors, General Assembly, Palestine, and NGOs

Introduction

The NGO sector has increased in size dramatically, it comprises a total of 2,319 registered organizations in the West Bank¹; employs 31,735 persons;² and has received a generous donor funding estimated at USD 1,305 million within the span of ten years (1999-2008).³ This increment of the NGOs numbers since the start of the 'peace' process between the Palestinian and Israeli sides in Madrid 1991, it has become a controversial topic. Palestinians have since questioned both the governance and the relevance of NGOs programs for different reasons (Qassoum, 2004). What motivate Palestinian founders to create NGOs; a question that's never answered by researchers through an independent study? Investigate on the creation motivation is important to in-depth researchers and people understanding and add a knowledge to ongoing debate about Palestinian NGOs, their linkages- affiliation and executives.

The paper is structured as follows: I begin with a review of the literature on PNGOs disagreement over motives behind the creation of the PNGOs and the definition of the NGOs, followed by the summarized methodology. The

¹ Official 2010 Statistics by the PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah covering only the West Bank.

² Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics covering both of Gaza Strip and West Bank (cited in Hamdan, 2010).

³ Estimations for the NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by (De Voir & Tartir, 2009: 29)

next section presenting the finding and discussion on real motives in non-profit governance though investigates Board of directors, general assembly members and executive manager's engagement over their organizations. A case study over 4 PNGOs are presented to illustrate more these motivations linked with the executive management actions over their organizations to fully control PNGOs. Finally, the paper ends with the conclusion section and short paragraphs of some recommendations.

Disagreement in the Literature

Literature does not agree on what motivate the creation of PNGOs. In the oPt, PNGOs are accused of being new elites' posing as caretakers of people's interests (Hanafi & Tabar, 2005) through working under various pretexts although they actually seek to generate private profit for their leaders (Nakhleh, 2011). Rafidi (2009) and Samara (2001) perceive NGOs as a Western invention and a tool for economic and cultural re-occupation and dominance of Palestine specifically and the developing countries generally. To them, NGOs are entities created by foreigners and/or locals that are dependent on foreign funds, lack open membership and grassroots connections.

Moreover, some PNGOs adopt political agendas and affiliations and their leaders are temporarily engaged with society in order to harness public influence, relationships, and followings sufficient for them to rise to political leadership (Hamammi, 2000). In the extreme perception, some even deprived NGOs from the 'national institutions' status they enjoyed prior to the creation of PA (Muhsen, 2010) in preference for the derogatorily '*Dakakeen*' i.e. private shops seeking the interests of their founders (Aweidah, 2010; Challand, 2006). Its noticeable writers from the PNGO sector especially those whom occupying top position keen on linking the foundation of their organizations and public needs and national struggle (Ashrawi, 2009; Ebrash, 2008; Abdaulhadi, 1997 ; Muhsen, 2010).

Disagreement also applied on the definition of NGOs, It is understood that NGOs are basically voluntary, non-criminal, and non-violent groups that are independent from the direct control of government and do not seek profit or control of government (Willetts, 2006). The term "NGOs" is often used interchangeably with 'community organizations', 'citizens' organizations', and 'grassroots organization' although each denotes different meaning and connotations in different circumstances. To be community organizations, NGOs have to show more distinctiveness than being non-governmental or not-profit seeking (Willetts, 2006).

Despite this consensus on the essential features, NGOs are treated as a particular breed, subsector or strata of a wider civil society (CSO). Civil society is composed of a "diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power" (Hagen, 2011, p. 8), including, charities, youth clubs, women's organizations, advocacy groups, think tanks, trade unions, and professional and business associations (Hilal, 2008). These actors may not have many things in common except for their public orientation. On the other hand, NGOs are thought of as akin to the private sector, particularly private companies, because of certain features. For example, NGOs tend to take on formal hierarchal structures and gradually tends to depend on paid employment rather than volunteering and limit public membership or involvement in their activities (Fries cited in Gray et al., 2006; Jad, 2007; Uphoff, 1993).

The Palestinian law uses a different set of terminology to designate two types of PNGOs: charitable societies and community organizations. The Palestinian law makes this distinction outright in its title of "Charitable Societies and Community Organizations Law No 1 of 2000" which defines both CSOs in Article 2 as:

[...] A society or an association is an independent legal body established by agreement by at least seven people, aiming to accomplish legitimate goals in serving the public without aiming to generate personal or collective benefits for its members (Article 2).⁴

It is noticeable that the law uses the term '*Moa'assa Ahlyya*'⁵ instead of NGOs or CSOs in the definition. In addition, it stated that any charitable society or community organisation with an independent judicial personality, established upon an agreement concluded among no less than seven persons to achieve legitimate objectives of

⁴ The Palestinian Associations Law is available on <http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=13431> and a translation of the full text of the Palestinian Law No. 1 of 2000 is available online at (<http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/laws/associations/charlaw-comorg-pal-00-e.pdf>)

public concern, without aiming at attaining financial profits to be shared among the members or achieving any personal benefits (Article No. 2 of Law No. 1, 2000).

Because of the above disagreement over the motivation, different set or classifications for PNGOs is existed. Classifying NGOs depends on who classified them. PNGOs are: professional and voluntaries, modern and traditional, urban and rural, development and charitable. Despitse of the above definitions and termonlogy, this article, refers to organizations that are registered with the PA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs except universities.

Methodology

This paper presents findings of a study on governance in PNGO sector undertaken in 2011-2012 in the West Bank. This paper based on a perception surveys conducted on a sample of 40 PNGOs, filled by top management, board members, general managers. The respondents to both surveys were chosen randomly from the PNGOs registry at the PA Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Ramallah. In addition to a case study over 4 organizations and an in-depth interviews were carried out with NGOs board members, directors, community activists, researchers and officials of the central and local authorities and members of the PA Legislative Council and PA officials in the executive branch (ministries and the Office of the President of Palestinian Authority). The organizations that have been observed are used as representative of PNGOs as a whole. The sample was selected randomly and covered organizations engaging in service delivery, advocacy and public policy, and combination of both. The sample of study i.e. 40 organizations conducted in 6 out of the 11 West Banks districts cover Ramallah, Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron, Tulkarm and Salfet.⁶

Finding & Discussion

Reminiscing of community activities before 1990s in the non-profit sector, a Palestinian official at the Ministry of Social Affairs in Ramallah once said “people then did volunteer more and the work was deeply rooted in the social fabric. Today it is not voluntary at all but NGOs leaders present it to society as such” (El-H., interview, 2 February 2011). This remark summarizes the fundamental changes in the third sector that turned the sacred right to association into a profitable endeavour indeed. The more institutionalized the non-profit sector becomes, the more it loses its dynamic interaction with the public, replacing the horizontal relations with strict authority lines and vertical structures. The intrinsic democratic values are also lost in this process, both internally and externally (Sbieh, 2011).

Motives in Non-Profit Governance

Eventually all organizations serve the public one way or another. By extension, it is supposedly the ideal motive for joining an organization or for creating that organization in the first place. The qualitative data collected from the field suggest many other self-serving interests and motives such as:

- Enlisting wider support from community and grassroots for certain political fractions (when politically affiliated) and individuals with political ambitions.
- Securing direct financial benefits for founders and their families and friends.
- Promoting social standing and influence in of ambitious individuals.
- Taking advantage of organizations for self-promotion and enrichment opportunities made available since the early 1990s (SA., interview, 1 February 2011; TB., interview, 20 February 2011; M.B., interview, 30 March 2011; El-H., interview, 2 February, 2011, ZEY., interview, 3 March 2011).

For instance, in a human rights centre, the founder/general manager seeks other employment when the funding stops, but returns to the NGO when donors resume their funding. In another example, five founders work as staff members of an economic development NGO. So while some individuals seek employment, travel, and financial benefits from their engagement in the non-profit sector, others seek senior positions in the PA or the political parties. (SA., interview, 1 February 2011). In one case, few female members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) formed several community organizations in refugee camps to convince *Fateh* of their popularity and ability to attract

⁶ The sample did not cover the entire PNGOs sectors, geographical areas, due to non-availability of funds as the data is collected through self-funded research

election votes but after they were elected, they stopped caring about the refugee camps (MS., Interview, 21 April 2011).

Moreover, the quantitative data paints a clearer picture revealing that original founders occupy the highest positions in more than half the organizations in the study sample. In many cases, the same person remains in top managerial position for 20 years or so and would not step down for other founders unless in accordance with a rotation leadership schemes practiced in some organizations. Nonetheless, this longevity in top ranks hints at individual dictatorship and eroded governance systems that fail to facilitate regular exchange of power or infusing the organizations with new blood⁷. NGO leaders seldom leave unless they move to new and better positions within the PA or international organizations (HA., interview, 10 February 2011; ZEY., interview, 3 March 2011). This compelled a proposition by activists for imposing a cap on the maximum number of 4-6 years in office (HA., interview, 10 February 2011). The interviewed managers rejected this proposition because the General Manager position is the highest position with no further promotion entailing that they are forced to work until their death or retirement (ET., interview, 15 March 2011; GI, conversation, 2 December 2010).

Table 1: Respondent NGOs with Paid Founder/Executives and Staff

Generation	Total Sample	Founder(s) Turned Chief Executive(s)	No of Positions Paid
Pre-Madrid Conference (before 1990)	9	5	227
Post Madrid – Intifada II (1990-2000)	13	6	241
Post Intifada II (2001-2010)	18	10	56
Total	40	21	524

The survey also indicated that 52.5% of organizations in the sample have retained one or more of its founding members in the General Assembly (GA), Board of Directors (BoD) or leading managerial positions (President, Executive Director, or General Manager) while very few function as deputy managers, program managers, or international or public relations officers. Only 3 organizations did not keep any of the founders, probably because they are all deceased. The major founders in numerous urban NGOs who turned to paid managerial positions, and remained active in the organizations as key is not the sole decision makers. Interestingly, the top positions in all 22 organizations are paid (21 are full-time). Many founders quickly become general managers and start receiving salaries (El-H., interview, 2 February 2011; ZEY., interview, 3 March 2011; RN., interview, 25 April 2011). The law prohibits BoDs from monetarily benefiting from their voluntary memberships although this is allowable for executives (Article No 20) and GA members. Therefore, the only way to distribute financial benefits is to allow the members to switch between GA, BoD membership and management positions.

When economic benefits accrue to some, they overshadow voluntary community activism and people’s willingness to dedicate time, effort and sometimes their own resources without expectations of returns (El-H., interview, 2 February 2011; SAR, interview, 26 April 2011). Some suggest that voluntarism requires free time and secured economic resources to not worry about basic survival. SAR maintains that

“The seniors, retired and the financially well-to-do can work voluntarily, unlike students, the unemployed or the poor. It is unrealistic to expect or ask them to manage organization or engage heavily in voluntary work without expectation of financial support or at least payment of the incurred personal expenses” (SAR., interview, 26 April 2011).

Furthermore, the way that the BoDs and founding members are assembled is very critical in determining how the organization will be governed. As founders want to become the key persons, they search for likeminded people as fellow founders and/or members of BoDs and advisory boards. Depending on the key founder’s interests and connections, certain names are enlisted to gain the trust of donors or PA and successfully pass the MoI screening during the registration process. Sometimes, this entails the selection of non-threatening individuals with no real

⁷ Some interviewees mentioned by name NGOs with General Managers in office since their creation.

experience in community or non-profit sector. In other cases, NGO founders suggest well known or public figures as BoD members in order to attract funding (SA., interview, 1 February 2011; I.B., interview, 16 February 2011).

Possibly related to this selection process, is the infamous multiple memberships in the non-profit sector where an individual joins more than one BoD. The entire sample, except for 2 NGOs, allows their BoD members to share others boards in other organizations. Even though it is legally acceptable, the practice has a contradictory and equally negative impact. While this strategy creates a certain group of totally closed and impenetrable organizations, it hampers members' contribution to each organization and ultimately leads to the weakening and marginalization of the BoDs themselves.

The multiple BoD memberships for busy persons mean that they do not take seriously their responsibility for governing either NGOs and practically relegate this task to directors. In addition, this allows the same persons to be members in BoD of other NGOs and directors of their own organizations. This ends up with a group of people who are simultaneously board members for multiple NGOs across the oPt and actually working as directors of their NGOs. 71% of surveyed urban NGOs and 56% of CBOs reported having BoD serving in other organizations, and 45% of the sample reported sharing 1-3 members.

Often times, the head of an organization joins as BoD member and allow others to join in, thus creating a tight net of people or a club serving their own interests (ZEY., interview, 3 March 2011; El-S., interview, 5 January 2011). Apparently, the main objective is to provide immunity against competition or being held accountable to their governance. From an economic perspective, it is an insurance against unemployment as they can easily switch positions inside the circle organizations under the pretext of compliance with democratic practices and election results (SA., interview, 1 February, 2011). Even the MoI is aware of how convenient multiple memberships are especially in NGOs affiliated or close to left fractions involving well-known figures (ZEY., interview, 3 March 2011).

In addition, when analyzed urban NGOs in the city of Ramallah show that:

- BoDs contain many senior officials of PLO and PA legislative or executive branches.
- BoDs also have senior officials of factions and political parties.
- Some GA members are usually connected through blood relations and friendship.⁸
- Few GA members have actual experience in community action.
- Some individuals have multiple affiliations in several GAs and BoDs,
- Some NGOs staff members are also members in their GAs.
- Some GA and BoD members are wealthy or business people.
- Some GA members are high ranking PA security officers or their aids.
- Some GA members obtained training, consultancy, and other paid assignments from their NGOs.

Undoubtedly, if this information is made public, it is easy to figure out the violations or at least the conflict of interests and the potential to hurt the reputations of many individuals. In person, they justify the situation to researchers and give them tips on how to understand the situation although they rarely write it down. All of this also indicates the importance for political figures to infiltrate urban NGOs as GA or BoD members. One interviewee summed it up by saying that "PA officials and PLO executive committee members kindly ask for memberships in urban NGOs" (EH., interview, 15 January, 2012). As a solution to their problem, the NGOs deliberately conceal such information from the public disclosing it only to a minimum number of trusted individuals. As for the PA and donors, this information is already known because the NGOs submit that in writing on an annual basis or when donors are interested in granting funding to the NGOs.

A Case Study Over 4 PNGOs

This case study provides examples of the deliberate concentrated power in the hands of main founder's which illustrating the interplay between personal and factional interests in NGOs. In one particular case, the BoD become

⁸ The PA NGO law prevents first and second degree relatives of BoD members from joining the GA but it is allowed for third degree and distant relatives.

weaker vis-à-vis the autocracy of the General Manager given the fact the latter maintained a huge influence not only over the organization but also over a major NGO network in the past few decades.

BCfRD was created by left-leaning politicians and academics in the late 1989 and early 1990 to undertake a policy development role. The PFLP appointed a BoD and a general manager (GM) who is a decedent of a wealthy Palestinian family. PFLP funded BCfRD until the PLO was hit by a major financial crises following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, *BCfRD* managed to attract post-Oslo donor funding without the need for PFLP's approval so that the BoD at the time clashed with the GM on the direction of the Centre's new programs. At the end the BoD resigned collectively in protest of the grave contradiction between *BCfRD*'s original mission and the liberal-agenda the Centre is forcing on the grassroots. Eventually the GM assembled a new BoD mostly from members not affiliated to the PFLP (KB., interview, 15 March 2011; NR., interview, 21 March 2011).

During the interviews, ex-BoD members admitted that the GM was delegated all authority because none of the members then had time to dedicate to the centre. Being the ultimate person in power, the GM discontinued reporting and made sure information was concealed from PFLP, the BoD and internal committees or even the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) formed upon his initiative. The GM even isolated the centre from PNGO and continued leading the organization for decades until he was appointed a PA ambassador in late 2000s (KB., interview, 15 March 2011; ER., interview, 15 December, 2011).

The role of the former manager and staff in turning the centre into a donor-driven NGO with a liberal agenda instead of a local one is well documented (Qassoum, 2004). The GM and donors determined the target areas and training despite BoD resistance (KB., interview, 15 March 2011). In addition, PFLP tried to revive the centre's original mission by hiring a professional Program Manager (PM) who soon became the GM's new ally. The PM eventually left the centre for a better opportunity at an international NGO (Qassoum, 2004).

The current BoD and staff believe that both former GM and PM looked after their own interests. The PM convinced donors to target certain areas including his residence (KB., interview, 15 March 2011). In contrast, a member of today's GA who was a BoD member believe that "the former BoD was aware of donor projects and that the former GM had genuine interest in in the centre's sustainability more than his own agenda" (NR., interview, 12 March 2011). However, upon further interviews with former staff and BoD members, the person who defended the former GM had never attended BoD's meetings but delegated all of his tasks to the former GM (NR., interview, 21 March 2011; KB., interview, 15 March 2011).

The Centre has not hired a GM but the acting GM and the new board enjoy good relations and are involved equally in the management in accordance with a shared vision. The acting GM seems to have played a role in keeping BoD and GA members engaged and informed through quarterly or monthly reports (KB., interview, 15 March 2011). In comparison to the previous one, the current BoD is more effective because the acting GM is avid on protecting the Centre from manipulation and BoD politics (ER., interview, 15 December 2010; EH., interview, 15 December 2010). Unlike *BCfRD*, the next section describes a case where a GM maintains control over the organization through manipulation of its governing body. It is a case showing that GMs can overpower BoDs and GAs despite their powers prescribed to them in the Palestinian Law of 2000.

The second organization PCdCD was formed in 1991 which coincided with the end of Soviet Union and the First *Intifada*. Funds were then made available globally to NGOs promoting Western notions of liberal democracy and civil society through NGOs involvement in community development, voluntarism, capacity building, and networking with grassroots organizations (PCdCD website, 2011).

For an NGO to adopt promotion of democracy and community development as its mandate is undeniably good, but to do so in a country still under occupation requires from the NGO at least a to make an effort to link its mission and strategic plans to national struggle and goals and institutionalize democratic practices in their governance and operations. This is quite a challenge for many Palestinian NGOs, PCdCD included.

PCdCD's former GM was the main founder so he applied his own formula to GA and BoD composition. He served as GM for more than 17 years until 2007 when he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Fayyad-led government in the West Bank, and appointed the PM, his close friend and aid, as the acting GM. This person

quickly formed new BoD and GA by replacing the members she perceived as a threat in the absence of the GM (MD., interview, 16 March 2011) because these bodies have the legal power to overthrow her if they wanted.

The next example shows that even new NGOs are dominated by self-interest and board politics. New NGO generation can be worse than old in terms of selfish interests fuelled by declining nationalistic sentiments, availability of funding and the rapidly growing NGO sector. The third organizations **JfRD** was created in 2003 during a politically sensitive era. By then the *second Intifada* that erupted in late 2000 was declining and Arafat was under pressure for Western governments for PA reform and implementation of the Road Map⁹ that demands from the PA to crack down on Palestinian factions proponent of armed struggle. The decline in foreign funding and the deteriorating economic conditions in the West Bank played a role in the birth of new NGOs like JfRD who adopted a new approach to community development and relief to fill in the gap in public service delivery. At the time, Israel militarily targeted PA institutions for systematic destruction and almost total paralysis in terms of service delivery. Many NGOs, like JfRD, adopted the notion of ‘community development’ out of necessity, frustration and disbelief in PA’s ability to launch a national development process. JfRD ‘s mandate of ‘community development’ tends to have a very wide definition encompassing ‘empowerment of youth and women to family-based economic production activities up to rural participation in national policy making processes’ (JfRD website, 2011).

The main founder served as Executive Director (ED) for few years before becoming ‘an advisor’. This person is a senior officer at Ministry of Labour, and a part-time university lecturer. All members of the founding committee and GA are *Fateh* members and/or supporters but the BoD consists of relatives and close friends, and chosen by the ED as an insurance against *Fateh*’s total control over JfRD. As an advisor, it sound that the founder has no actual power to exercise. But it fact, “he is kept informed by the current ED who is just an officer carrying out the Advisor’s instructions. The Advisor masks his intentions by believing that both BoD and staff want his continued involvement because of his experience and the organizational memory he accumulated through running JfRD for years” (TNA., interview, 22 February 2011).

This justification is for continued involvement of founding members or former managers in NGO decision-making is popular in the oPt, suggesting that management experience and capacity is limited to few individuals only. The fourth example illustrates this practice is followed in a respectable service delivery organization.

The fourth organization: **TRC**’s main founder remains the top executive since TRC creation in 1983¹⁰ by a group of respectable public figures from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who took part in Madrid conference in 1990 and the following negotiations.¹¹ The BoD consists of fellow professionals and personal friends of the EP (SEH., interview, 24 February 2011). As TRC operates in the West Bank, none of the founding members or high-profile BoD members has the time or the physical presence to attend BoD meetings or follow up with TRC affairs. The Executive President (EP) himself described the creation process by saying that:

“I am the main founder. TRC is my baby. The idea came up from my experience voluntarily visiting Palestinians political detainees in Israeli detention. I realized how important to have this centre so I communicated with few friends. I feel that the centre is my child and do care about the centre continuity” (SEH., interview, 24 February 2011).

⁹ President Bush’s Road Map to the Palestinian State is available on <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2989783.stm>

¹⁰ The centre website reviewed in 4 October 2011. There are differences between the Arabic and English pages of the website. The website hails its voluntary roots and creation in the early 1980s thus implying that it served Palestinians long before the outpour of foreign aid in the aftermath of Oslo Accords. This can be refuted easily, as the centre actually opened in 1997 with European funding dedicated to human rights organisations (SEH., interview, 24 February 2011).

¹¹ TRC founding committee consisted of Haidar Abdul Shafi, the head of Palestinian delegation to Madrid plus few Palestinian negotiators, senior PA officers, and the GM of a human right centre in Gaza Strip.

Apparently the EP believes of his indispensability to TRC management that repeatedly asked him to remain the leader. The staff also reported that the consulting firm that evaluated the centre's performance had also made the same recommendation.

From the above it is possible to discern two main motives behind the creation of NGOs especially in the post-Oslo era. The first motive revolves around serving the personal interests of the founder while the second motive is providing further support to affiliated political factions. The first motive explains the quick transition of founders from voluntary to paid top managerial positions, indefinite involvement, manipulation of BoDs and GAs, and control of decision-making. The second motive of serving political factions and their supporters coexists and overlaps with the first goal of serving personal interests both of which seem to drive many urban NGOs although it has expanded to local CBOs as well.

Conclusion & Recommendations

The major two motives behind creation of PNGOs have to do with the interplay between factional political interests and the financial interests and/or political ambitions of NGOs founding members. They overlap in a third motive, i.e. the creation of services and long-term employment opportunities for factions' supporters and leaders. About half of NGO key individual founders currently occupy paid positions. Similar trends were noticed in similar organizations created by PA officials belonging to the legislative and executive branches. In addition, NGOs decision-making powers are mostly retained by PNGOs top executives who also have the power and influence to designate the members of both governing bodies (GA & BoD).

This paper recommends putting an end of favoritism and discrimination in PNGOs memberships, services and programs, NGOs should target the public and all social groups without discrimination or favoritism in terms of employment opportunities, membership criteria, and service provision. In addition, to **activate NGOs governing Bodies by:** opening their membership based on pre-determined criteria for GA membership and encourage both GA's members and the public to participate in the discussion of NGO issues.

BoD members should be assigned real tasks to fulfill and assume full responsibility in managing overall NGOs activities voluntary and prevent the top executives from hijacking the organizations and decisions. In addition, it's important to keep GA members involved and updated on all developments pertinent to NGOs activities, programs, constraints, challenges, progress, and resources used or needed on a monthly or other periodical basis.

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